The century ahead by Wilson, C.
The twentieth century was, above all
else, a century of population growth; 
the twenty-½rst century will be a cen-
tury of aging. Between 1900 and 2000
the world’s population quadrupled,
from around 1.5 billion to over 6 billion.
Most of this increase occurred after
World War II. At present, it seems un-
likely that the population will grow by
more than about a further 50 percent.
The most plausible forecasts see a pop-
ulation numbering between 9 and 10 
billion by about 2050, with stability or
decline in total population thereafter.
However, the population at older 
ages will increase far more quickly in 
the coming century than in the last. In-
deed, the end of population growth and
its replacement by aging are logically re-
lated. All rapidly growing populations
are young. If each birth cohort is larger
than the one before, there will always be
plenty of young people.
Population growth was so characteris-
tic of the recent past that we tend to re-
gard it as the norm. However, for most
of human history the long-run rate of
population growth has been very close 
to zero. From the biblical Adam and Eve,
it would have taken only thirty-two dou-
blings of the population to reach over 8
billion. At the rate of population growth
seen in the 1960s and early 1970s–over 2
percent a year, implying a doubling time
of around thirty years–and given that
the gap between generations is also usu-
ally about thirty years, such an increase
could have taken place inside a millenni-
um. Even James Ussher’s 1650 estimate
of October 23, 4004 b.c. as the date of
creation implies we have been around
much longer than that. And since Homo
sapiens actually emerged one hundred
and ½fty thousand or so years ago, the
rate of growth has obviously been close
to zero.
Similarly, extrapolating the growth
rates of the recent past into the future
soon yields logically impossible ½gures.
Ansley Coale once calculated that a
growth rate of 2 percent a year sustained
for ½ve thousand years would lead to the
sheer volume of human beings exceed-
ing that of the solar system.
The absence of growth is a necessary
but not suf½cient condition for aging;
Dædalus  Winter 2006 5
Chris Wilson
The century ahead
Chris Wilson is a staff member of the World Pop-
ulation Program at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenberg, Austria.
One of Europe’s most widely cited demographers,
he is currently researching the causes and conse-
quences of global demographic convergence.
© 2006 by the American Academy of Arts 
& Sciences
we also need long life expectancy. In
populations before the modern medi-
cal era, relatively few people survived 
to reach three score years and ten. Thus,
population aging is a novelty requiring
both long lives and a low growth rate
(i.e., low fertility). Though rare in the
past, these conditions are now becoming
the norm around the world.
When demographers try to under-
stand the determinants of aging, they
use one of social science’s great general-
izing models: the demographic transi-
tion. When a population modernizes, 
it undergoes, along with many other
aspects of development, a set of inter-
connected changes called the demo-
graphic transition. According to this
model, every population at some point
has high fertility (mostly between four
and six children per woman) and low 
life expectancy (mostly between twenty-
½ve and forty years). With the spread 
of modern medicine and public health,
mortality improves; as family planning
and contraceptive use become the norm,
fertility falls. Usually life expectancy
rises ½rst, with a delay before fertility
declines. This difference in timing leads
to substantial population growth before
the two processes come back into bal-
ance.
This process of transition began in the
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in Europe, the United States, and the
other neo-Europes; it became a global
phenomenon after World War II. Today,
more than half of the world’s people live
in places where fertility is at or below
the level needed for long-run intergener-
ational replacement (about 2.1 children
per woman), and global life expectancy
is approaching seventy years.
Trends in mortality can be followed in
considerable detail for many European
countries from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, and for a few especially well-doc-
umented cases, as far back as the late
1700s. For Japan and the United States
detailed information dates back to the
early twentieth century. What these sta-
tistics reveal is both simple and striking.
There has been an enormous reduction
in mortality, with life expectancy for the
two sexes combined now approaching,
or even exceeding, eighty in most devel-
oped countries. Even more remarkably,
this progress has been very regular for
many decades. Jim Oeppen and James
Vaupel have shown, for example, that
the trend in “best-practice” life expec-
tancy (i.e., the country with the lon-
gest life expectancy in each year) has
been linear for more than 150 years.1
In each decade the “state of the art” has
increased about 2.5 years. Moreover, al-
though there has been some variation at
the national level, most developed coun-
tries have demonstrated strongly linear
trends in life expectancy for the whole of
the twentieth century.
Paradoxically, although this trend has
been evident in mortality statistics for
many decades, it is only in the last few
years that it has been recognized. De-
mographers, actuaries, and others con-
cerned with forecasting mortality had
always hitherto assumed that life expec-
tancy was approaching some asymptot-
ic limit and would thus level off in the
near future. But if there is some biologi-
cal limit to extending longevity, there is
no sign of it yet. As Oeppen and Vaupel
point out, estimates of the maximum
possible life expectancy made through-
out the twentieth century were, on aver-
age, surpassed within ½ve years of being
made. This consistent error is of more
than purely academic interest–pension-
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and health-care systems have been fund-
ed on the basis of large underestimates
of the number of elderly people in the
future.
The linearity of the upward climb in
life expectancy has occurred in spite of
the fact that very different age groups
and causes of death have been involved
in different eras. Before World War II,
almost all progress took place in reduc-
ing infectious diseases, with the biggest
impact for infants and children. In con-
trast, today much of the improvement 
is concentrated at old ages. Perhaps 
the best analogy for these remarkable
changes is to be found in models of eco-
nomic growth. Just as modern theory
hypothesizes the existence of an endoge-
nous rate of growth that is in some sense
built into our economic system, so too
there may be an endogenous rate of im-
provement in health, as measured by life
expectancy. In any event, we have every
reason to expect that continued increas-
es in the average length of life will aug-
ment population aging.
There are, of course, exceptions to this
optimistic picture. In the Soviet Union
and its client states in Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe, life expectancy stagnated
from the 1960s until the end of Com-
munism. It then worsened still further 
in many cases, in the immediate after-
math of revolution. In Russia and many
of the post-Soviet states it remains low,
especially for men. Male life expectan-
cy in Russia today is roughly the same 
as it was in 1950: about sixty years. To
put this stagnation into perspective, the
equivalent ½gure for the United States
has increased since 1950 by almost ten
years from sixty-six to seventy-six.
In the post-Communist countries fur-
ther west, however, the last decade has
seen rapid improvements; life expec-
tancy there will likely converge to levels
seen in Western Europe within a few de-
cades. The origins of the health crisis
under Communism and its persistence
in Russia, Ukraine, and the other post-
Soviet states is a matter of heated de-
bate in both the scienti½c and general 
literature. Whatever the cause, the cri-
sis serves as a warning against unqual-
i½ed Panglossian optimism. Likewise,
the emergence of hiv/aids and the
associated reemergence of tuberculosis
make clear that all future estimates of
improvement in public health must take
into account the potential for severe re-
versals.
Overall, however, the last half-centu-
ry has seen unprecedented convergence
in mortality patterns around the world.
While rich countries still lead in life
expectancy, the gap between these lead-
ers and most developing countries has
shrunk substantially. In fact, there has
been more convergence in demography
than in any other aspect of moderniza-
tion. For example, consider Latin Amer-
ica as a whole, where the United Nations
estimates current life expectancy is sev-
enty-two years, and gdp per head (ad-
justed for inflation and other factors) 
is below $4,000, according to the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. Now consider the United
States. Life expectancy in the United
States was seventy-two years as recent-
ly as the early 1970s. In contrast, the U.S.
gdp per head exceeded $4,000 by 1900.
Latin America is a century behind the
United States in income growth, but on-
ly thirty to thirty-½ve years behind in life
expectancy. We can make similar com-
parisons for most developing countries.
And though the gaps in educational at-
tainment or urbanization are somewhat
smaller than in gdp per head, none of
the other conventional quantitative in-
dices of development has converged as
rapidly as demography.
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In recent decades there has also been a
striking convergence in fertility, which
has declined rapidly in most countries.
More than half of the world’s popula-
tion now lives in countries or regions in
which fertility is below the level needed
for intergenerational replacement.2 In
most of Southern Europe (including
Italy and Spain) and in most of Central
and Eastern Europe, the total fertility
rate (the number of children born per
woman) is below 1.3. Similar values are
now seen in Japan, South Korea, and
many of the more developed parts of
China. Even some countries that might
seem unlikely candidates have experi-
enced rapid fertility decline. In Iran, 
for example, fertility fell from over six
children per woman to just over two
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.
In contrast, fertility in the United States
has seemed to defy gravity, staying close
to or even above the replacement level
for the last two decades. Among the de-
veloping countries in which fertility is 
now lower than in the United States are
China, Brazil, Thailand, and Tunisia. If
the trends of the last twenty-½ve years
continue for another decade or so, the
U.S. fertility level will be well above the
median for the human population as a
whole.
The very speed of fertility decline in
many countries will produce an exagger-
ated form of aging. While aging is an in-
evitable and global phenomenon, coun-
tries in which fertility has fallen rapidly
will experience a form of ‘super aging’ 
in the middle decades of this century.
The baby boom cohorts of Southern
Europe or the pretransition cohorts in
China are very large compared to those
that followed, and their getting old will
greatly exacerbate any problems that ag-
ing generates.
There is also a sense in which aging
can be ‘locked in’ as part of a country’s
demographic regime through a form 
of negative momentum. For example, 
in Southern Europe, the large number 
of baby boomers moving through the
childbearing ages has disguised the very
low fertility rate of recent decades. The
largest age groups at present are those
ages 25 to 39. In the coming decades,
however, the much smaller cohorts 
born since the mid-1980s will be in the
reproductive ages. Unless these cohorts
(currently ages 0 to 19) have much high-
er fertility than their parents, the num-
ber of births in countries such as Italy
and Spain will shrink even more rapid-
ly in the future than it has so far. In con-
trast, the United States and other coun-
tries in which fertility has stabilized at
close to the replacement level (in Eu-
rope, they include France and the Nor-
dic countries) will face much less severe
challenges from demographic disrup-
tion.
The future is always uncertain to 
some degree, but when trends have 
been so clear and so consistent for de-
cades, they form a solid basis for pre-
diction. It is very close to certain that
aging will be one of the de½ning global
phenomena in the twenty-½rst centu-
ry. The ways in which societies choose 
to adapt to this new reality will test the 
old adage that “demography is destiny.”
Fatalism, however, is uncalled for–to 
a substantial degree we can still choose
our future. However, demography does
impose strong constraints on the range
of feasible options. Taking these con-
straints into account is the basis for in-
formed reactions to the challenges posed
by aging.
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